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The Illegal Process: Basic Problems in the Making
and Application of Censorship
A Response to Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U
Chi L Rev 863 (2012)

James Grimmelmann†
The principal question for consideration is whether the
United States should enact “[a] statute enabling censorship of
Internet material” along the lines described in Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair.1 The article will not be reproduced here, although it rewards careful reading. Rather, the present emphasis
will be on certain structural features of Professor Bambauer’s
argument, with particular reference to some of the institutional
issues they raise.
I. INTRODUCTORY NOTES AND QUERIES ON TERMINOLOGY
1. Professor Bambauer’s subject is Internet filtering: how
governments do it, what forces constrain it, and what is to be
done about it. The essential characteristic of such filtering is
that Internet intermediaries—Internet service providers like
Comcast and Verizon, search engines like Google and Bing, domain name providers, and the like—design their systems to
make some content inaccessible. Professor Bambauer unapologetically describes this filtering as “censorship.”2 What justifies
the term? Is it simply a matter of linguistic precision, or does the
term have a rhetorical force of its own? Given that he is proposing a censorship statute, what explains his willingness to embrace this ordinarily pejorative term?
2. If censorship is the systematic suppression of speech, does
it matter how a censor acts? Consider the “modalities of regulation” framework described in Lessig, The Law of the Horse:
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1
Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U Chi L Rev 863, 930 (2012).
2
See id at 874–75.
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What Cyberlaw Might Teach.3 Professor Lessig argues that from

the regulator’s perspective, the four modalities—law, norms,
markets, and code—are substitutes for each other. What is filtering, then, but code-based online censorship? Compare an offline censor who burns books or cuts words out of letters with an
online censor who cuts network links or blocks packets. Does the
analogy hold? Does it shed any light on Professor Bambauer’s
use of the term “censorship?”
II. NOTES AND QUERIES ON HARD AND SOFT CENSORSHIP
1. Orwell’s Armchair opens with an analytical distinction
that will be central to what follows: between “hard” and “soft”
forms of censorship through filtering.4 There are two forms of
hard censorship:
In direct control, the government installs filters on computer infrastructure that it owns.5
In deputization, the government orders private intermediaries to install filters on infrastructure that they own.6
They are contrasted with three forms of soft censorship:
In pretext, the government uses unrelated laws to impose
filtering.7
In payment, the government offers rewards to intermediaries who install filters.8
In persuasion, the government uses the bully pulpit to pressure intermediaries to install filters.9
What justifies the labels of “hard” and “soft?” All filters are code.
The reader who is unable to obtain a copy of Emmanuel Goldstein’s The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Computation because of Internet filtering is equally unable whether the filter is
mandated by law or “voluntarily” deployed by a nominally private
actor. Would it be more accurate to say that what is firmer or
3
Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 Harv
L Rev 501, 507–11 (1999).
4
Bambauer, 79 U Chi L Rev at 870–71 (cited in note 1).
5
Id at 875–78.
6
Id at 878–83.
7
Id at 883–87.
8
Bambauer, 79 U Chi L Rev at 887–91 (cited in note 1).
9
Id at 891–99.

The University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue

60

[79:58

squishier is the nature of governmental influence on the persons
who control the filter code? To say that the distinction is between direct and indirect forms of control over filtering? To say
that Professor Bambauer is making not merely a procedural
point about how censorship happens but also an institutional
point about who does the censoring?
2. Professor Bambauer argues that the government’s use of
hard censorship is substantially more constrained by law than
its use of soft censorship.10 If so, who is it that is doing the constraining? Comrade O’Brien seems unlikely to respect the Constitution simply because it is the Constitution. He will have to
be reined in by the courts, will he not? And courts’ willingness to
take up these reins will depend on the strength or weakness of
their institutional position and the strength or weakness of the
popular consensus against the pernicious ideas contained in
Goldstein’s tract. If the sober jurisprudential conversation posited in Orwell’s Armchair is a conversation that can only take
place in certain political and institutional climates, does it seem
likely that the present United States is such a climate? Does the
collapse of the proposed filter-mandating Stop Online Piracy
Act11 (SOPA) in January 2012 due to vehement popular protests
count as pretty good evidence that it is?
3. Why might it be that the law is hard on hard censorship
but soft on soft censorship? Is this a simple failure of the judiciary to do its job of policing the legislature and executive in cases
where the latter have not acted according to law? Is the greater
difficulty of checking soft censorship through law reflective of an
inherent institutional incapacity on the part of the judiciary?
a. What is deputization but official censorship plain and
simple? Is there anything to distinguish ordering Verizon to
install anti-Goldstein filters from ordering a bookstore to
remove his book from its shelves? Is there any possibility
that the courts would now make such a distinction? Was
there ever a time when there was, and if so, what has
changed?
b. Is direct control truly out of the question? Does the
fact that most Internet infrastructure is privately owned
mean that the public-forum question has never been squarely posed? If Comrade O’Brien were to nationalize the Ameri10

Bambauer, 79 U Chi L Rev at 926–27 (cited in note 1).
HR 3261, 112th Cong, 1st Sess, in 157 Cong Rec H 7133 (Oct 26, 2011), online at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr3261ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr3261ih.pdf (visited Feb
16, 2013).
11
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can portions of the Internet and install filters, is there any
serious question about the outcome of the resulting First
Amendment challenge?
c. Should we perhaps understand pretext as hard censorship in sheep’s clothing? Given that the very point of pretext is to circumvent the normal limits on legislative action,
it can hardly be presumptuous to expect the courts to look
behind pretextual rationales and judge legislation according
to its actual effects. Or can it?
d. Do payment and persuasion stand on somewhat different ground because the legislature acts through means
other than the creation of primary private duties? What is it
about the use of the power to appropriate and the power to
jawbone that renders them less susceptible to oversight?
III. NOTES AND QUERIES ON LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE
CENSORSHIP
1. Professor Bambauer argues that it is possible to distinguish “legitimate” from “illegitimate” censorship. In particular,
he writes, “Legitimate censorship has four virtues: it is openly
described, transparent about what it restricts, narrow in the
material to which it applies, and accountable to the people it
seeks to protect.”12 Can there be any serious question that accountable censorship is better than unaccountable censorship,
that focused censorship is better than clumsy censorship, and so
on? How general are these propositions? Are they specific to censorship, or are they applications of more general legal norms?
2. Professor Bambauer refers to his criteria as a “processbased methodology”13 and defends them as being “compatible
with divergent views on what material should be banned.”14 How
far can procedural criteria go in settling questions about censorship? Does it follow that because procedurally regular censorship is more legitimate than procedurally irregular censorship,
it is legitimate in an absolute as well as a relative sense? Is this
a question that can be settled in the abstract, without reference
to the material to be censored? Is it right that whether Winston
Smith shall be permitted to read The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Computation should turn only on the process Comrade O’Brien follows and not on the contents of the book? But if
12
13
14

Bambauer, 79 U Chi L Rev at 899–900 (cited in note 1).
Id at 873.
Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 Duke L J 377, 380, 438 (2009).
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it is necessary to make normative judgments about whether particular material can appropriately be censored, is it possible to
say anything about global censorship that does not rest on contested moral and social values? Is Professor Bambauer’s theory
an attempt to apply a quintessentially liberal methodology—
procedural justice—to a quintessentially illiberal subject—
censorship?
3. Can Professor Bambauer’s procedural criteria be understood in institutional terms? What are openness, transparency,
and narrowness but basic conditions that legal norms must fulfill if they are properly to be called “law” at all? And what is accountability but a demand that legal norms must originate from
the political branches of government? Is it fair to say that a filtering decision that satisfies the procedural criteria is an institutional settlement of a contested question, that is, a decision
duly arrived at as the result of duly established procedures by
the institution best suited to make decisions of this type? Is it
therefore entitled to deference from other actors in the system,
namely courts?
4. Is there something about the structure of filtering decisions that renders them particularly unsuitable for generation—
as opposed to application—by the courts? One facet of China’s
experience may be instructive here. The state apparatus responsible for filtering decisions issues ill-defined but binding statements of general (and frequently shifting) policies, which intermediaries are expected to implement on their own.15 Dramatic
and unpredictable overblocking is the predictable result. Has
Professor Bambauer endorsed a clear-statement rule for filtering, under which Congress is permitted to require online censorship but must make its intent unmistakable and provide precise
direction when it deviates from a background norm against censorship? Or might it be that a clear statement in favor of censorship is precisely the one thing courts know they must not permit, so that the entire subterfuge of soft censorship is in fact a
legal fiction willingly acquiesced in by all parties?
5. Professor Bambauer easily concludes that hard censorship is more legitimate than soft.16 How could it be otherwise?
a. Deputization—the creation of primary private duties—will ordinarily require the open and accountable en15 See Human Rights Watch (HRW), World Report: 2006 245–47 (HRW and Seven
Stories Press 2006), online at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k6/wr2006.pdf (visited Feb
16, 2013).
16 Bambauer, 79 U Chi L Rev at 930 (cited in note 1).
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actment of legislation. The enforcement of those duties by
the judiciary will ordinarily require transparency. Narrowness is a property of the fit between the two. The procedural
legitimacy of deputization is almost tautological, is it not?
b. Direct control is an interesting middle case. Does direct control locate day-to-day control of the infrastructure in
the executive rather than in the legislature? Is it problematic
if it does? How plausible is it that government-operated
routers would be open to the kinds of public scrutiny necessary to verify the nature of the filtering actually being engaged in? Would such information properly be the subject of
a FOIA request? On what statutory grounds, if any, might
Comrade O’Brien colorably deny such a request? Does it
matter whether the government is acting as proprietor or as
sovereign? Is there a difference? Is direct control just payment writ large? If so, does it still deserve the designation of
“hard” censorship?
c. Pretext is by definition illegitimate, is it not? Would
the answer change if “pretext” were described instead as “the
routine application of general legal norms to online activities?” If a domain name facilitates illegal gambling activity,
why should it be any less subject to seizure than other property used in facilitating gambling? Or is this rhetorical shift
itself a kind of pretext precisely analogous to the pretext involved in applying anti-gambling laws to domain names? Is
the danger that pretext works precisely because labels matter and courts have difficulty looking behind them to understand the actual consequences for speech? On the other
hand, is there anything wrong with pretextual legislation or
pretextual prosecution, as long as the legislation or prosecution itself could be independently and honestly justified? Put
another way, does the focus on pretext inappropriately project a judicial virtue on branches of government where it
does not apply? Or is the point that these other branches
may act pretextually, but they may not conscript the courts
in their rhetorical shell game?
d. After National Federation of Independent Business v
Sebelius,17 do courts now possess meaningful criteria to limit
Congress’s use of its power of the purse to inhibit speech?18
Or is an analysis that depends on distinguishing the gov-

17
18

132 S Ct 2566 (2012).
Consider id at 2606–07.
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ernment-as-funder from the government-as-censor necessarily intractable? Consider the similar difficulties besetting
campaign finance and telecommunications law, two other areas in which government subsidies for speech coexist uneasily with government regulations of speech. If the power to tax
is the power to destroy, is the power to spend the power to
censor?
e. Is persuasion the least law-like of the modalities of
censorship? Is it anything more or less than the threat of legislation without the substance? Is it better described as corruption? As extortion? Or is it sometimes a form of grandstanding, in which officials take demagogic positions for
political gain? If that is right, then does it perhaps score
highly on openness since the officials must identify themselves publicly with the censorial goal in order to reap the
demagogue’s political rewards? And does this suggest that a
theory of accountability must include a fairly rich account of
the political process and must mean something more than
just accountability to a majority of the relevant electorate? Is
the problem with persuasion that it permits individual officials to usurp the authority of the institutions to which they
belong?
6. Is there a connection between the greater legal constraints on hard censorship and its greater legitimacy? Is the
more exacting judicial scrutiny of deputization the cause of its
greater adherence to rule-of-law virtues? Or is it the fact that
deputization acts through the prototypical mechanisms of law
that makes it susceptible to meaningful oversight? Are the forms
of governmental action used in soft censorship deviations from
the Platonic ideal of lawmaking, or are they indispensable elements of the lawmaking enterprise?
IV. NOTES AND QUERIES ON NONLEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON
CENSORSHIP
1. Law is not the only possible check on official censorship.
Professor Bambauer argues that the other three modalities—
code, markets, and norms—should also be understood as ways to
limit censorship.19 Can law also be an antiregulatory force? If
not, what makes it different? Recall Professor Lessig’s corollary
that law can commandeer the other three modalities for regula-

19

Bambauer, 79 U Chi L Rev at 906–09, 920–26 (cited in note 1).
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tory purposes20 and Professor Bambauer’s claim that
deputization—law mandating code—is a form of hard censorship. If the four modalities are all tools deployed by actors in a
complex global ecosystem to influence each others’ conduct, what
remains of Professor Lessig’s original insight that these modalities are regulatory substitutes? Is the answer perhaps that we
should be clearer about distinguishing how a regulatory modality is applied to its subject from the political economy of how regulation is developed and deployed? In considering the following
questions about the effectiveness of the other antimodalities,
due regard should be given to the institutional setting: the reaction by private parties to the situation in which they find themselves as a result of governmental or quasi-governmental action.
a. To what extent are the merits and demerits of code as
a check on filtering captured by the phrase “arms race”? Given that software can be replicated and distributed at nearzero cost, how is it that government attempts to target circumvention code can be expected to raise the costs of circumvention? Does the United States’ experience with
anticircumvention rules in the digital rights management
context suggest that legal prohibitions on circumvention
tools in the filtering context will be effective or ineffective?21
Filtering-circumvention tools are most commonly used today
in countries with politically repressive regimes.22 Is there
anything about this experience that might be unlikely to
translate to the United States? If so, what does it imply
about the effectiveness of a domestic anticircumvention law?
b. Professor Bambauer points to high concentration in
Internet infrastructure markets as a reason that market
forces may be an ineffective check on filtering.23 What ever
happened to “The Net interprets censorship as damage and
routes around it”?24 How much of this concentration is essential to the existence of a single, unified Internet, and how
20

See Lessig, 113 Harv L Rev at 512–13 (cited in note 3).
See, for example, Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 103(a), Pub L No 105-304,
112 Stat 2860, 2863–64 (1998), codified at 17 USC § 1201(a) (declaring that “[n]o person
shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access” to certain copyrighted materials, and barring distribution of circumvention tools).
22 See, for example Cormac Callanan, et al, Leaping over the Firewall: A Review of
Censorship Circumvention Tools 46–57 (Freedom House 2011), online at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Censorship.pdf
(visited
Feb 16, 2013).
23 Bambauer, 79 U Chi L Rev at 920 (cited in note 1).
24 See Philip Elmer-Dewitt, First Nation in Cyberspace, Time (Dec 6, 1993) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting John Gilmore).
21
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much is the accidental result of historical factors and political choices? If existing intermediaries are unwilling to offer
access to censored material for which there is demand, will
this create countervailing market pressures for disruptive
new intermediaries to develop alternative forms of access? If
not, what structural features of these markets might explain
their resistance to entry?
c. Professor Bambauer argues that norms are an imperfect constraint on soft censorship because their strength varies with the community and with the material to be blocked.
If true, is this fact an argument for or against his processbased methodology? He further argues that clever framing
by censors and collective action problems will inhibit the development of antifiltering political movements. What then of
the SOPA protests from January 2012?25 Were they an aberrational moment in an otherwise unbroken narrative of public complacency? Is their vehemence to be explained by the
fact that it was hard censorship at stake rather than soft? Or
do they imply that norms can sometimes be an effective
check on soft censorship?
2. Professor Bambauer suggests that it is paradoxical that
soft censorship is primarily constrained by practical limits such
as the availability of funds rather than by any principled limits.26 Is this so surprising in light of his arguments about the absence of principled limits? If soft censorship were truly unconstrained in all ways, would we not expect to see it used with
impunity and ubiquity? Since soft censorship remains the exception rather than the norm, must it not be the case that there are
some limits on it somewhere? And having ruled out legal limits,
should we not expect that the actual limits are pragmatic?
Would it be fair to say that while government has many tools at
its disposal, none of them are free? That just as payment draws
on the public fisc, persuasion also draws on political capital, and
that neither can be spent without limit? If all censorship, hard
and soft, operates within these budgetary constraints, how
might this fact be employed to prevent censorship or to channel
it in the direction of greater legitimacy?

25 See Jenna Wortham, Protest on Web Takes On 2 Bills Aimed at Piracy , NY
Times A1 (Jan 18, 2012).
26 Bambauer, 79 U Chi L Rev at 926–27 (cited in note 1).
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V. NOTES AND QUERIES ON THE DRAFTING OF A HYPOTHETICAL
INTERNET-FILTERING STATUTE
1. Professor Bambauer outlines a potential federal Internet
filtering statute.27 The features and likely effects of such a
scheme will be considered presently, but first some attention
should be given to the drafter’s apparent attitude toward his hypothetical statute. He pointedly declines to endorse the proposition that “interdicting online content is normatively desirable.”28
But consider the following quotations from his Article:
[I]f hard censorship is more legitimate than soft, and society
determines that government should prevent access to certain materials, then the federal government should pass
and implement a statutory scheme for online censorship.29
...
[H]ard censorship is normatively preferable to soft censorship.30
...
[O]nline censorship is inevitable: nearly every government
seeks to block some material on the Net.31
Does it not follow, by the introduction of a conjunction and the
application of modus ponens, that the government should enact
a censorship statute? What then is the significance of Professor
Bambauer’s normative reservation? Should he be understood as
arguing that the government is justified in enacting a censorship statute but that he would prefer to be counted as a conscientious objector to it? Or is this a lament about the ubiquity of
online censorship coupled with an attempt to make the best of a
bad situation?
2. The defining feature of the Bambauer Act is its extensive
regime of procedural safeguards. It vests the filtering power exclusively in the US Attorney General, requires prior notice and
adjudication before the implementation of any filtering request
and regular review afterwards, sets the government’s burden of
proof at clear and convincing evidence, permits only narrowly
tailored blocking, and requires that intermediaries be reimbursed for their compliance costs.32 Given Professor Bambauer’s
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id at 927–38.
Id at 927.
Id at 868–69.
Bambauer, 79 U Chi L Rev at 870 (cited in note 1).
Id at 936.
Id at 931–35.
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proceduralist jurisprudence, are these provisions a surprise? Are
there any provisions not on the list that should be added to it?
Any on the list that could be safely removed?
3. Can the Bambauer Act be understood in institutional
terms? Its provisions naturally break down along institutional
lines. Is that a happy accident of how the Act is explained, or
does it reflect deeper commitments of the legal philosophy from
which it springs?
a. Does restricting filtering authority to the Attorney
General reflect a judgment about the competence and motives of the Department of Justice as compared with other
possible institutions? Should the Attorney General’s authority be delegable? Compare the list of officials authorized to
request wiretaps in 18 USC § 2516.33 Should filtering authority be broader or narrower than wiretapping authority? Do
they raise similar intellectual-freedom concerns? Are the two
in some sense substitutes for each other?
b. Do the requirements of prior notice, an opportunity to
be heard, and review for changed circumstances reflect a
judgment about the nature of adjudication, a judgment about
judicial independence, or both? Would an adjudicatory proceeding before a filtering tribunal within the Department of
Commerce before an Article I administrative law judge suffice? Is it possible to imagine a category of filtering requests
so clear-cut, so routine, or so numerous that rulemaking
would be a suitable alternative procedure?
c. The Act’s choice of a clear-and-convincing burden of
proof makes a statement about deference, does it not? Is it fair
to say that the entire tenor of the Act bespeaks a profound
skepticism of the motives of executive actors and that the Act
invites judges to partake of that skepticism? If so, should they
extend their scrutiny to matters beyond the quantum of
proof required? For example, would it be appropriate for a
judge in a filtering case to demand detailed evidence from
the government even in the face of a procedural default by
the target of a filtering order?
d. Who is best positioned to ensure that a filtering order
is narrowly tailored to the material to be blocked? Professor
Bambauer’s answer is that intermediaries should be charged
with implementing the filters “using technically feasible, financially reasonable efforts” and should be reimbursed for
33

18 USC § 2516(1).
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their efforts.34 What institutions, if any, will be in a position
to monitor the effectiveness of the filtering as implemented?
What effect does cost-shifting have on the private incentives
of intermediaries?
e. The entire scheme is shot through with attempts to
make filtering orders both open and transparent. To what
extent is this goal in tension with the goal of any filtering
scheme to make certain material unavailable? How far is it
possible to go in detailing what is being blocked without giving away the game? In the face of such concerns, who can be
counted on to ensure that the required disclosures really are
taking place? It may be instructive to consider the United
States’ experience with public oversight of executive electronic surveillance, and the courts’ experience overseeing the
redaction of court filings.35
VI. NOTES AND QUERIES ON THE EFFECTS OF A HYPOTHETICAL
INTERNET-FILTERING STATUTE
1. How plausible is it that the United States might actually
adopt a statute along the lines of the Bambauer Act? Will the
Act’s rigorous preconditions to filtering orders make it unappealing to parties who simply wish to limit access to the speech that
they hate? And how likely is it that free-speech advocates will endorse a statute that purports to authorize official censorship? Is
the Act the kind of compromise that is politically feasible because
it shares the pain broadly? Or does it fall in an unhappy medium
that will satisfy no one? Might Professor Bambauer have other
reasons for proposing an Act he personally opposes and that
seems unlikely to be enacted?
2. What would actually happen if the Bambauer Act were to
be made law? Would Comrade O’Brien seek to employ the hardcensorship powers it grants to the government? Is he likely to be
satisfied with the results? Is Professor Bambauer perhaps playing a game of eleven-dimensional chess with Comrade O’Brien
by proffering an Act that purports to give him the censorial power he seeks, while channeling him into procedural devices that
will be largely ineffective in practice? Or is it more likely that
Comrade O’Brien will continue to employ the techniques of soft
34

Bambauer, 79 U Chi L Rev at 936 (cited in note 1).
Consider Peter A. Winn, Judicial Information Management in an Electronic Age:
Old Standards, New Challenges, 3 Fed Courts L Rev 135, 151 (2009) (describing pervasive failures to redact social security numbers from publicly available federal electronic
court filings).
35
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censorship if he runs up against the Bambauer Act’s constraints
on hard censorship? Is it possible that the Bambauer Act is too
legitimate?
3. The question can also be put in institutional terms.
Would the passage of the Act affect judges’ willingness to countenance soft censorship? Would their sympathy for softcensorship techniques of evasion and deception decrease if the
government had available a statute on point that it declined to
proceed under? Or would the same institutional factors that currently make the courts poor guardians against pretext, payment,
and persuasion continue to hinder them even with the
Bambauer Act on the books? Could the Act increase courts’ deference to executive acts of soft censorship by declaring a public
policy that explicitly tolerates some forms of censorship? Does
the answer depend on how the Act is drafted? How should a
principled judge attempt to resolve such questions? Should the
Bambauer Act be regarded as an institutional settlement of the
censorship question?
4. Is Professor Bambauer’s preference for hard censorship
over soft based on an assumption that the level of online filtering is exogenous to the choice of mechanism? It can hardly be
gainsaid, can it, that all else being equal we should prefer the
more legitimate form of censorship? But is it not equally plausible to say that the level of online filtering is itself in large part
determined by the mechanisms available? Does legitimate censorship legitimate censorship?

